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From airfield to airport: an institutionalist-historical approach to the early 
development of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol, 1916-1940 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, the development of Dutch airports during the antebellum period from military airfields to mixed-airfields 
and finally to a municipal airports is examined from an institutionalist-historical approach. Specific attention is given to 
the evolution of Amsterdam Airport Schiphol within a regional socio-economic context and within a national context of 
local competition, particularly between the big cities in Randstad Holland. This paper argues that the rise and 
development of Schiphol and its impact on the surrounding urban area (city and the region) can be characterized as a 
co-evolutionary process involving different actors within various domains – economic, political and institutional – and 
at different spatial levels. Airport development, therefore, has to be conceived as the result of a collective arrangement 
which has determined the spatial and economic development of the airport itself and the surrounding area.  
 
Keywords:  collective arrangements, institutions, municipal airports, Schiphol Airport. 
 
Introduction 
Saturday, 2nd July 1938 thousands of people gathered at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol to 
demonstrate against the national government’s plans for the establishment of a new, national airport 
somewhere near the city of The Hague. The Ministry of Waterworks in cooperation with the 
National Aviation Board and KLM, the Royal Dutch airline company, was determined to construct 
a new, modern airport at a central location in Randstad Holland (the metropolitan area formed by 
the four big cities of Amsterdam, The Hague, Rotterdam and Utrecht), which would replace – or at 
least marginalize – the existing airports near Amsterdam and Rotterdam: Schiphol and Waalhaven. 
If this plan was to be carried out, Schiphol would indefinitely lose its status as the Dutch main 
airport – a status which it had managed to establish over the past two decades of its existence. 
According to one of the initiators of the protest meeting the citizens of Amsterdam were keen to 
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proof that ‘they loved Schiphol and considered the airport to be an integral part of their beloved 
city and could not accept the amputation of such an important part of Amsterdam life’.1 Speeches 
were made by G.H. Crone, the chairman of the chamber of commerce, G.C.J.D. Kropman, the city’s 
Commissioner of Commerce and A.F. Bronsing, the director of an Amsterdam steamboat company, 
all stressing the importance of Schiphol for Amsterdam to maintain its status as a centre of traffic, 
commerce and industry. Moreover, the proximity of the airport to the economic capital of the 
country was explicitly mentioned as a prerequisite for airport development. In turn, the presence of 
the airport near Amsterdam was considered as crucial for the future economic development of the 
city: Schiphol needed Amsterdam as much as Amsterdam needed Schiphol. Hence, the construction 
of a new airport many miles away from the Amsterdam region was an example of a complete lack 
of understanding regarding airport development – at least according to those gathered at Schiphol.2 
Finally, members of the Amsterdam city council were embittered by the fact that the national 
government only started to show interest in airport development at a time when Schiphol finally had 
developed into one of the best equipped European airports after many years of financial investments 
by the municipal government. Eventually, as will be explained later on, Amsterdam managed to 
turn the tide in its favour: instead of constructing a new airport, after the Second World War 
national government would decide to officially reestablish Schiphol as the ‘Dutch National 
Airport’.3 
 The nature and background of the demonstration at Schiphol airport raises a couple of 
intriguing and relevant questions with regard to the early history of Dutch airport development. In 
the Netherlands airport development apparently involved actors at different spatial levels, for 
instance representatives of both the national and the local government, and within different 
domains: government, business and civil society. This article aims to explain this notable political 
and social involvement in Dutch airport development throughout the first decades of its existence 
through a focus on the interaction between the main actors and the key political, social and 
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economic factors which have determined the early history of Schiphol and other Dutch airports. We 
will particularly explore the institutional and economic relations between the airport and the city of 
Amsterdam, the (economic) capital of the Netherlands, as well as the relations between Schiphol 
and rival Dutch airports near The Hague, the center of Dutch national government, and Rotterdam, 
the nation’s largest port city, which competed with Schiphol in the early stages of Dutch airport 
development for the status of ‘national airport’. 
Despite the wave of studies on airport development in Europe and the USA which have been 
published over the past two decades, research focusing on the wider implications and 
interdependency of airport and urban development has been scarce. Most studies deal with specific 
topics such as airport design, architecture and engineering, infrastructure, the early history of single 
airports, or the remarkable feats of aviation pioneers, like Brodherson’s research on the construction 
and design of airport facilities and installations in the early days of the development of airports, 
Douglas’ study on the evolution of technology and the increased complexity of airports, 
Myerscough’s excellent survey of the provision of British aerodromes and airports during the inter-
war years and Dierikx and Bouwens’ extensive monograph on the history of the Airport Schiphol in 
the European context which also primarily focuses on airport architecture and design.4 Moreover, 
the 1990s witnessed a plethora of case studies of individual airports in the USA.5 
These studies, nonetheless, have touched upon very relevant issues with regard to airport 
history. Bednarek for instance has posed one of the key questions which also applies to our 
investigation: how and why were airports at first run by municipal authorities? In both the USA and 
the Netherlands, as opposed to many other European countries, airport development at first was a 
local issue. The construction of airports was the result of collective efforts of local politicians and 
businessmen who believed in the impact aviation could have on their cities and businesses. 
According to Bednarek financial considerations were key in the involvement of local actors; federal 
institutions which were to benefit from airport development, but lacked the money to actively 
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support it, like the US Post Office, looked to municipal governments or other local (business) 
interest groups for support. Fueled by local boosterism – aimed at improving the local economy –
civic pride or a strong belief in the future of aviation, many cities took up the challenge.6 Although 
Bednarek’s analysis cannot simply be applied to our case – for instance because of huge differences 
in the financial relations between cities and the national government in the Netherlands and the US 
– her study has signaled the need to approach the early history of airport development from various 
perspectives. After all, apart from important economic and infrastructural functions, airports also 
possess important cultural and institutional aspects such as image, perception and collective 
governance, which involves various actors at different spatial levels – local, regional, national and 
international – and in different institutional settings in state and society like public authorities, 
businessmen, city planners, architects, technicians and engineers.7 
For our analysis of the interplay between the various actors involved in airport development 
the concept of collective arrangements will be used. Collective arrangement is a key concept in 
institutional economics, an economic discipline which comprises a wide range of approaches 
highlighting the important role of institutions and institutional structure in the economy and 
society.8 We define a collective arrangement as a set of processes, ideas, visions, actors and factors 
which produce rules, norms, values, conventions, and policies within a certain institutional setting. 
As such, a collective arrangement constrains and structures the behavior of and interaction between 
the different actors within the institutional setting. Collective arrangements may be formal or 
informal, they may involve two or more individuals or organizations, and they may be temporary or 
long lived. In any case, collective arrangements	  are bound in time and space in the sense that they 
are created in a specific historical context and in specific places. Applied to our investigation of the 
early history of Schiphol a ‘collective arrangement’ is seen as the result of a combination of policy, 
agreements, governance structure, and economic support (for instance investments) aimed at the 
creation, improvement and transformation of the airport’s economic and spatial structure in relation 
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to its wider urban or regional environment. In turn, the interactions between different actors and 
factors either directly or indirectly influence the long term development trajectory of the airports 
and their spatial and economic configuration. In this sense, the structure of collective arrangements 
is shaped through the interplay of people, goods, money, knowledge and information and the 
accompanying social-economic and spatial interventions, agreements and regulations.	  
The rise and development of Schiphol airport during the 1920s and 1930s may be viewed as 
the result of successive collective arrangements which have structured and determined the 
development and growth of the airport on the long run. The demonstration at Schiphol airport for 
instance was part of the emergence of a new collective arrangement, which eventually led to the 
establishment of Schiphol as a national airport after the Second World War, which would replace 
the existing collective arrangement regarding Schiphol as a municipal airport. Different actors at the 
local, regional, and national level were involved in determining the contours of this new collective 
arrangement which could only be formally established after long negotiations, discussions and 
research. We distinguish between three principal actors which were involved in the development of 
Schiphol airport: individuals (key persons from civil aviation or aviation enthusiasts, members of 
local business communities and users of airport services), local government or representative 
entities such as municipalities, city councils and chambers of commerce and the state which 
includes supralocal (regional) and national bodies like ministries and national (semi)public 
institutions like the National Aviation Board.  
In the next section we will identify these actors, elaborate on their specific role, motivations, 
objectives as well as their formal and informal position vis-à-vis other actors, and explore how they 
contributed to the emergence and transformation of the collective arrangements which have directed 
the development of Schiphol and its wider region from 1916 onwards. Apart from their formal 
nature, collective arrangements, however, also exude certain collective representations and 
perceptions with regard to airport and urban development, like visions of the future of airports and 
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aviation, as manifested in spatial planning concepts and designs.9 Those issues will be discussed in 
the second section when we elaborate on the Dutch ‘airport-battle’: the competition between the 
municipal airports in Amsterdam and Rotterdam and the debate about the establishment of a new 
national airport as mentioned in the start of our introduction. 
 
Collective arrangements and the early history of Schiphol 
The collective arrangement which has formed the basis for the creation of Schiphol in 1916 was the 
Dutch Ministry of War’s decision to construct a military airfield in the Haarlemmermeer polder, an 
agrarian municipality to the southwest of Amsterdam (see map 1 bellow showing the location of 
Schiphol and Amsterdam). Schiphol was one of several small military airfields across the country, 
but the only military airfield within the Fortress Holland (in Dutch: Vesting Holland) which formed 
the key element of the Dutch defensive strategy. The Schiphol military airfield was located in the 
northeastern part of the Haarlemmermeer. The choice for this location was not an arbitrary decision 
but the result of an extensive search for a suitable location for a new military airfield by the 
Commandant of the department of aviation, captain H. Wallard Sacré. After two unsuccessful 
attempts to build a military airfield in two different locations in the vicinity of artillery sites near 
Amsterdam, the military decided to construct the new military airfield at Schiphol.10 As soon as 
Schiphol airfield became operational, it, however, turned out to be too small for landing military 
aircraft; especially in crosswind. The landing and starting of airplanes needed a minimum surface of 
approximately 80 by 80 meter. Between May and November 1917, the military therefore decided to 
expropriate seventeen parcels of land from different private owners. As result, the size of Schiphol 
grew to 60 ha at the end of 1917 and 76 ha by the end of 1920.  The airfield’s physical conditions 
were, however, deplorable because of lack of good drainage facilities and the absence of electricity 
and water supply. During the rainfall season, the airfield turned into a muddy terrain; Schiphol was 
known among the pilots as ‘Schiphol Les Bains’.  
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Map 1. The location of Schiphol airport within the Amsterdam-Haarlemmermeer region (c. 
1927)à  Insert about here 
 
Throughout the 1920s the development of Schiphol was guided by a relatively clear and 
simple collective arrangement. By this we mean that the number of actors and persons involved was 
limited and most of them knew each other. Apart from the Ministries of War and  Public Works a 
few other actors were involved in the development of Schiphol, particularly the city of Amsterdam, 
Dutch airline company KLM, the Dutch Air Traffic council (hereafter RLD), and to a lesser extent 
Fokker, the leading Dutch aircraft manufacturer. Amsterdam had started to show increasing interest 
in the airbase after a successful aviation exhibition which was organized in 1919: the First 
International Air traffic Exhibition Amsterdam (hereafter: ELTA). Many aviation enthusiasts were 
involved in the organization of this event ranging from people belonging to the Amsterdam 
financial sector such as Eddy Fuld, a prominent Amsterdam banker and a future member of the 
supervisory board of KLM, representatives of the Dutch military - General C.J. Snijders, Captain 
Wallard Sacré and Lieutenant pilot M.L.J. Hofstee - and members of the city council of 
Amsterdam, particularly liberal councilor D. Manassen. During six weeks more than 500.000 
people visited the ELTA exhibition and admired the impressive Handley Page Bomber, the Vickers 
Vimy Bomber and Dutch airplanes manufactured by Fokker, Trompenburg and Van Berkel. After 
the exhibition the ELTA buildings were put into use by Anthony Fokker’s aircraft manufacturing 
company. Building on the successful organization of the ELTA, a group of prominent persons from 
the business world (financiers, bankers and businessmen) decided to join force to create a Dutch 
airline company: KLM, headed by Albert Plesman.11 The stakeholders of the KLM were several 
Dutch banks and major trade and shipping companies.12 KLM immediately asked permission to use 
Schiphol for commercial activities after signing an agreement with the post office in March 1920 
for transporting airmail between the cities of Amsterdam and London. In May 1920, the first 
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commercial aircraft landed at Schiphol military airfield and in in June 1920, the military airfield 
Schiphol was officially declared open to commercial traffic, albeit partly and with a maximum of 30 
flights per month. Schiphol nonetheless quickly developed into an important airport in the emerging 
European network of air services as KLM increased its operations and opened new line services 
such as those to Hamburg and Copenhagen which started in September 1920.13 
Map 2. Military airfield Schiphol (1919 – 1926) à  [insert about here] 
 
With opening access to civil aviation the initial collective arrangement regarding Schiphol as 
a military airfield was replaced by a new, more complex arrangement which transformed Schiphol 
into a mixed airfield. The establishment of this new collective arrangement opened new 
opportunities for further development of Schiphol from a military to a civil airport and sets 
Schiphol apart from other Dutch airports who maintained their military status. In fact Schiphol was 
now governed by two State Ministries – the ministry of War and the ministry of Public Works 
which was responsible for civil aviation operations – but was primarily operated by personnel of the 
Ministry of War.14 Other key actors within this collective arrangement were KLM-director Albert 
Plesman and Dutch airplane constructor and aviator Antony Fokker. Both, as we will see, more or 
less had their own vision on the development of Schiphol, but each of them played an essential role 
in the early development of the airport. The relationship between Plesman and Fokker was as much 
characterized by cooperation as  conflicts. Both were visionary and pragmatic persons with great 
passion for the civil aviation in general and fervent proponents of the development of Dutch civil 
aviation in particular. A large part of the KLM fleet consisted of Fokker aircraft; in fact the early 
development of the Dutch civil aviation, KLM and Fokker were closely intertwined.15 The 
relationship between these two companies and their relationship with Schiphol was of great 
importance for the development of commercial aviation in the Netherlands: Fokker furnished new 
airplanes to KLM and the performances of KLM helped to promote the Fokker airplanes. Plesman, 
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however, was first and foremost a businessman with a commercial mentality which surpassed 
nationalistic feelings. When Douglas started to produce its famous DC series in the 1930s Plesman 
did not hesitate  to purchase these aircrafts and set up Fokker airplanes aside.16 In the eyes of 
Plesman, KLM was more important than friendship. This also applied, as will be discussed below, 
to the relationship between Plesman and Schiphol-representatives, particularly the managing 
director of the airport Jan Dellaert. 
In the early 1920s, with the increase of the scope and size of services provided by the 
military for an ever growing number of civil aircraft and the rising costs of airfield services – like 
the lighting of the landing ground, fire control, medical services and passport checks – the 
coexistence of two different air activities at the same airfield was questioned by the military 
authorities. Moreover, the military lacked the financial means to make necessary improvements to 
airport infrastructure. Schiphol lacked, among other things, terminal buildings, hangars and 
passengers check-in desks. Moreover, Schiphol was not properly connected with Amsterdam by 
road or train; the only transport system connecting Schiphol and Amsterdam was a KLM bus 
service. People travelling by car were forced to pass through two toll bridges and cross a narrow 
bridge over the Rijnvaart canal encircling the Haarlemmermeerpolder before reaching the airport. 
The 11,5 kilometers from Amsterdam to Schiphol took over thirty minutes or more.17 
Both the Ministry of War and KLM pinned their hopes on the Amsterdam government to 
improve the conditions at Schiphol. They were supported by the Amsterdam Chamber of 
Commerce which considered the development of Schiphol to be one of the main contributors to the 
future economic development of the city. The airport was expected to act as a magnet for attracting 
firms and activities to Amsterdam. Moreover, the Amsterdam business elite, people like Eddy Fuld 
who had been involved in ELTA and others who were financially involved in KLM and Fokker, 
wanted to secure their investments. The municipality, however, appeared to lack the expertise, 
political power and financial means to effectively operate and manage an airport. Despite the fact 
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that almost none of the European and American airports and airlines at the time were able to gain 
profit, Amsterdam municipal government was, nonetheless, keen to take over Schiphol and invest in 
its future development. In 1926 the Amsterdam city council almost unanimously decided to take 
over Schiphol.18 Amsterdam got the right to manage and exploit the municipal airport for a period 
of 10 years with an option for another thirty years. Following this agreement between the 
municipality of Amsterdam and the ministries of War and of Public Works, the airport was 
managed and operated by Amsterdam and only a small part of the airport was preserved as a 
military terrain. In 1935 Amsterdam agreed to take over the military part as well.19 
The emergence of a network of local lobbyists and national businessmen was key in turning 
airport development from an issue of military strategy or mere aviation enthusiasm into an 
economic issue using a rhetoric of progress and modernity which fed into the self-perceived need of 
Amstedam governors to improve their city’s economic potential and competitiveness and therefore 
managed to persuade the Amsterdam city council to take over Schiphol airport.20 Key figures and 
institutions within the new collective arrangement were Schiphol-director Jan Dellaert, members of 
the Amsterdam Chamber of Commerce, Amsterdam mayor Willem de Vlugt and various municipal 
departments. Like Plesman, Dellaert had started his career as a pilot; both had attended the military 
school at Soesterberg airfield near Utrecht. When KLM settled at Schiphol in the early 1920s 
Plesman asked Dellaert to act as chief of the station building. He was a man with great knowledge 
of aviation and a very competent manager. When the municipality of Amsterdam took over the 
airport from the military in 1926, Dellaert would be appointed as the first managing director of the 
municipal airport. Thanks to his personal relationship with Plesman, he was able to defend the 
interests of the municipal airport as well as the interest of the main user of airport facilities: KLM. 
Moreover Dellaert was aware of the fact that the futures of KLM and Schiphol were closely 
intertwined. Dellaert made sure Amsterdam kept investing in airport facilities in order to commit 
KLM to Schiphol and improve the competitive position of Schiphol in Europe.21 
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The chamber of commerce consisted of local representatives of trade and business who were 
dedicated to the protection and promotion of business interests and who often also belonged to the 
city’s social elite and were therefore ensured of access to the worlds of government and finance. 
Ernst Heldring, chairman of the Amsterdam chamber of commerce in the 1920s was a prominent 
member of the liberal party, born into a wealthy, upper class family and famous for his numerous 
additional activities in social and cultural life.22 Like their colleagues in The Hague and Rotterdam, 
the Amsterdam chamber showed great interest in the development of aviation and pressed for local 
governmental intervention in municipal airport development.23  
Within Amsterdam local government mayor De Vlugt in particular was occupied with 
connecting the world of politics and business in order to boost the city’s economy, using his 
contacts at different levels of government and his ties with Dutch businessmen. De Vlugt for 
instance exerted himself to reach an agreement with the national government on the construction of 
a new connection of the Amsterdam harbour with the Rhine and was involved in bringing the 1928 
Olympic Games to the  city of Amsterdam.24 The fact that he was able to do so had everything to do 
with the political willingness of Amsterdam councillors and aldermen to invest in their city’s 
(economic) future.25 The enthusiasm of De Vlugt, Dellaert and the chamber of commerce for airport 
development was not based on clear-cut economic calculations, but was merely fed by their belief 
in the winged gospel, a shared belief in the benefits airport development would bring to the city in 
the future. Outside government the winged gospel was also preached by a group of active 
individuals in the aeronautical circle such as the Royal Dutch Association of Aviation (De 
Koninklijke Nederlandse Vereniging voor Luchtvaart (KNVvL). Members of the KNVvL were 
actively involved in attracting support from national and local authorities and the public for the 
development of a national civil aviation trough the organization of promotion campaigns, flight 
shows and the publication of articles, studies and report concerning the future development of 
aircraft technology and airports for civil aviation, Schiphol in particular26. 
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From 1926 onwards the development of Schiphol airport would be coordinated by the 
municipal Department of Commerce, which was responsible for the management of the airport – 
carried out by Dellaert – and the Department of Public Works, which drafted plans for the future 
expansion and improvement of the airport. Within the Amsterdam municipal planning department, 
the development of Schiphol airport was treated as a key issue with regard to the overall economic 
development of Amsterdam and its region. The spatial sprawl of the Amsterdam Region increased 
rapidly during the 1920s and 1930s with the annexation of a number of surrounding municipalities. 
The ongoing development of airplane technologies and the corresponding increase of commercial 
aviation also resulted in the gradual spatial expansion of airport facilities and equipments, which in 
turn called for a more systematic approach to the development of the airport in the future and its 
relation to the nearby Amsterdam urban area.  
The airport expansion plan for Schiphol was developed in 1935 by the urban planners and 
urban designers of the city of Amsterdam in cooperation with the airport authorities – particularly 
the director of trade L. Boogert and the managing director of Schiphol Jan Dellaert –  the 
municipality of Haarlemmermeer,  the province of North-Holland and other external experts like 
engineer professor  Zweers from the Delft Polytechnic Academy.27 The planners responsible for the 
development of the expansion plan of Schiphol were the same planners and designers who 
developed the internationally reknown General Expansion Plan of Amsterdam (AUP) of 1934: 
Th.K. van Lohuizen, L.S.P. Scheffer and C. van Eesteren. The AUP gained international fame for 
its innovative urban planning which was based on the combined use of statistical analysis – for 
instance with regard to transportation infrastructure – and forecasts of population growth. 
The Schiphol expansion plan not only consisted of the development of the airport itself, but also 
dealt with issues like housing construction for the employees of Schiphol and the KLM in the 
surrounding municipalities, the total surface of land to be expropriated from private owners, and the 
spatial organization of airport facilities.28 Moreover, the Schiphol Expansion Plan was integrated 
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into the urban expansion plan of the municipality of Haarlemmermeer as a first step to coordinate 
the expansion of the airport and the surrounding area. In this sense, the future expansion plans for 
Schiphol constituted an integral part of the overall urban expansion plans of the city of Amsterdam 
and the municipality of Haarlemmermeer, which clearly indicates the importance of Schiphol as one 
of the main economic engines, in terms of employment and (freight) transport, for Amsterdam and 
the region. Barrett’s analysis of airport development in the United States which was not conceived 
at the drawing board, but resulted from the interaction between ‘the leaders of corporations and 
chambers of commerce along with politicians, city engineers, and federal bureaucrats whose 
decisions determined the relationship between the airport and the city’, therefore does not entirely 
hold true for Schiphol: plans were made at the drawing board and played a part in the discussions 
about airport and urban development.29Improvements of the airfield and facilities at Schiphol were 
carried out shortly after Amsterdam had taken over responsibility over the airport. The terrain was 
renewed and leveled, an underground drainage system was constructed and a big white circle was 
put at the middle of the landing terrain in order to serve as a clearly visible landmark for landing 
aircraft. In addition, a large concrete apron was constructed at the front of the KLM hangar, office 
space was extended and the airport was equipped with a terminal building, paved runways, hangars, 
radio-installation, lighted beacons and a control tower. Road access to the airport was also 
improved. Municipal authorities managed to convince the national and provincial government of 
the need to integrate Schiphol in the national and provincial road network.30 Within the course of 
two decades the rather primitive Schiphol airfield developed into a modern European airport (see 
Map 3 bellow which shows the situation in 1939 after the expansions of Schiphol). 
 
Map 3. The Spatial Expansion of Schiphol from 1926–1939 à  [insert about here] 
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The improvements at Schiphol were inspired by foreign ideas and experiences. From the 
second half of the 1920s an international network emerged which generated cooperation among 
airport operators and facilitated the exchange of experiences, ideas and (technical) information. This 
usually happened through regular meetings of European airport operators, but also through 
correspondence, conferences, and publications in professional magazines. Two main technical 
issues at Schiphol for instance were solved partly by copying practices from other airports, 
especially in the US: the drainage system and the construction of paved runways.31 Compared to 
foreign airfields like Le Bourget near Paris, Croydon in London or Tempelhof in Berlin, these 
improvements were, however, much less impressive and very modest in size, design and scope, due 
to the lack of municipal financial means. It is, however, difficult to compare different airfields 
across Europe, because of great differentiation between airports in terms of their construction, 
design, management and exploitation.32 While Tempelhof airport and, to a leser extent, Le Bourget 
benefited from state financial support, Croydon and many other local airports in the UK – like 
Schiphol – were financially supported by less affluent local governments.  
At first, Croydon, like Schiphol, was owned by the military, the Air Ministry, and did not 
enjoy any attention or support from the national authorities. The equipment of the airport was very 
modest and its configuration was very simple: a landing terrain with a terminal, a freight building 
and airline offices and technical departments scattered over the site. In 1926, Croydon was 
expanded with a new spacious terminal, a control tower, four large hangars, a repair shop and a 
hotel. In time, however, Croydon lacked space for further expansion of airport facilities and by the 
mid 1930s, the air ministry decided to build a new airport at Heston which would become the home 
airport of British Airways. As opposed to Croydon, the French airport Le Bourget managed to rise 
to dominance in the 1920s. In fact, Le Bourget was the most important airport of Europe until 1934 
when Berlin-Tempelhof took over the leading position. Like Schiphol and Croydon, Le Bourget 
also had its origin in the military. In 1919 the airport was divided into a military section and a civil 
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aviation section. The Air Ministry was still responsible for the development of the airport which 
was reconstructed in the mid 1930s with the erection of, among others, a new terminal building and 
a motorway connecting the city centre of Paris and Le Bourget. 
Tempelhof, the airport of Berlin, was the most modern European airport of the interwar 
years. The airport was commercially run by the Berlin Airport Company, established in 1924 with 
the city of Berlin (52 percent), the central government (24 percent) and the state of Prussia (24 
percent) as shareholders.33 The airport was equipped with an oval shaped landing field, a hard 
surface apron, and a passenger terminal. The configuration plan of Tempelhof was based on a new 
approach of passengers handling; air travellers, luggage and freight were separated and handled at 
different levels of the terminal building. Tempelhof developed into the main hub of an airline 
network that stretched out to Amsterdam, London, Paris, Vienna, Warsaw, Moscow and 
Copenhagen. As was the case for many European airports, the terminal facilities soon became too 
small with the rapid increase in air traffic. It was after Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 that expansion 
of the airport would take shape at a larger scale. The landing terrain was expanded to 1800 by 2300 
meters and a colossal terminal complex with a huge departure hall was built in addition to the 
extensions of aircraft hangars and repair shops and the construction of sheltered parking space for 
the loading and unloading of passengers and goods which turned Tempelhof in the largest airport in 
the world at that time.34  
 The faith of these European airports illustrates the fact that airport development depended 
on the prevailing collective arrangement. In the case of Schiphol, run by the local government, 
funds were lacking for massive redevelopment. Schiphol registered a continuous financial deficit 
and the total costs of operating and expanding the airport facilities pushed Amsterdam to seek funds 
in the financial market, which in turn resulted in high interest payments. This explains why 
Schiphol was much less impressive in terms of design, size and equipment than, for instance, 
Tempelhof. 
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[Figure 1. Annual Costs, Net Result & Municipal Subsidies. Source, Annual Reports 
Municipal Airport Schiphol (1928-1940)] 
 
Eventually, towards the end of the 1930s airport authorities, in this case municipal 
authorities, turned to the national government for financial support. Due to the economic crisis of 
the 1930s, the increasing costs and complexity of airport expansion and construction, and the 
Amsterdam municipal government’s chronic lack of funds, public intervention became urgent and 
financial support from the state was seen as prerequisite to insure the survival of the airport in 
general and national civil aviation in particular. This did not only apply to Schiphol but also to the 
majority of other European airports which were operated by local authorities or private airport 
operators.35 The Dutch national government in turn aimed to strategically invest their money in an 
airport which appeared fit to face the challenges of the future, rapid development of aviation. This 
meant that a choice had to be made between Schiphol and its main competitor Waalhaven, but the 
national government also studied the possibility of constructing a new national, ‘central’ airport in 
Randstad Holland. In Amsterdam those plans, as mentioned in the introduction, were met with 
fierce prostests.  This debate about the future of Dutch aviation, and the local boosterism and 
competition which accompanied it, will be discussed in the next section in order to explore the 
growing complexity of the different collective arrangements which have characterized the early 
history of Dutch aviation. 
  
The Dutch airport battle 
In the 1920s and 30s several plans were presented for either the expansion of existing airports or the 
construction of new ones near Rotterdam, the Hague and Amsterdam or in between these  cities, in 
an area better known as Randstad Holland. The Dutch ‘airport battle’ was driven to a great extent 
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by the involvement of the chambers of commerce and the municipal government of Amsterdam, 
Rotterdam and The Hague. Local boosterism, efforts to diversify the city’s economic structure and 
the urge to ‘think modern’ turned airport development into an important element of metropolitan 
politics. In Amsterdam local boosterism was particularly produced by mayor De Vlugt and the 
city’s Chamber of Commerce which can be best understood against the background of 
Amsterdam’s recent economic history. 
In the nineteenth century Amsterdam had forever – or so it seemed – lost its status as one of 
Europe’s major economic centers. Already in the eighteenth century the city had lost much of its 
economic vitality. While England had built up an entirely new type of industrial production based 
on steam and coal, the industries of the Amsterdam-Zaan region still mostly relied on wind and 
water power. It took until the last quarter of the nineteenth century for this to change. A new, 
progressive political culture ended the erstwhile dominant laissez-faire policy of the local 
governors. Moreover, a new commercial and industrial elite, profiting from extensive exploitation 
of the Dutch East Indies, was willing to invest in their city’s future. The local government together 
with the national government started to invest in the city’s infrastructure: 1876 marked the opening 
of the North Sea Channel, which connected the Amsterdam harbour to the North Sea near the city 
of IJmuiden. The following decades Amsterdam invested in the construction of a new waterway 
connecting the harbour with the Rhine, thus ensuring a connection with the economically very 
important German hinterland.36 Despite these investments, Amsterdam entered the twentieth 
century predominantly as a cultural and financial center. Thanks to its better connections with the 
sea and Germany, Rotterdam emerged as the Dutch main port and the industrial capital of the 
Netherlands. The Amsterdam economy, on the other hand, was dominated by the transportation, 
commercial and financial sectors.37 Urban government, nonetheless, was still ambitious enough to 
try and compete with Rotterdam.  
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Since airports were seen as complementary to the harbor activities, both cities were willing 
to invest in the development of an airfield. When Rotterdam established a municipal airport in 
1921, airport Waalhaven, Amsterdam was determined to follow suit. In fact airport development in 
both cities was closely associated with the urban governments’ efforts to maintain their city’s 
economic position vis-à-vis each other.38 Rotterdam airport Waalhaven boasted a modern 
infrastructure, whereas the more primitive Schiphol airport offered better possibilities for future 
expansion. In Rotterdam the city council decided to offer interesting cost advantages – for instance 
reduced landing fees – and subsidies to airline companies which used the facilities of the airport. 
The Amsterdam city council in turn urged for the expansion of the existing airport.  
In this sense the urban governors’ response to the development of civil aviation in general 
and Schiphol and Waalhaven airport in particular reflected a mix of ‘traditional local boosterism’ 
and a belief in ‘the winged gospel’. Urban government was keen  stimulate growth and 
development, which often resulted in competition with rival cities. Airports and aviation in general 
played a significant role in these efforts to boost the image of ‘modernity’. The Dutch took pride in 
the achievements of KLM and Fokker as is illustrated by the celebrations surrounding air races and 
the media coverage of pioneering flights.39 As illustrated by Bednarek, some aviation enthusiasts 
were merely in the ban of the ‘winged gospel’, unconstrained by economic or political 
considerations. KLM-director Plesman, for instance, was not concerned with the boost aviation 
could give to the urban development of Rotterdam and Amsterdam, and instead was motivated by a 
true belief in the unlimited opportunities of aviation and the pivotal role of the KLM.40 
Furthermore, there was a widely shared believe in the future opportunities of air transportation in 
linking countries and continents, which was marked by Charles Lindbergh’s pioneering transatlantic 
flight in 1927. The same year KLM carried out two successful return flights to Batavia, the capital 
city of the Dutch East Indies, which aroused considerable public enthusiasm.41 Moreover, the 
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annual reports of Schiphol and KLM during the inter-war years show a continuous increase in the 
number of passengers, freight and post transport (see figure. 2 bellow). 
 
Figure 2. Development of passengers, freight and post transport by KLM or through 
Schiphol. à  [Insert about here] 
  
In Rotterdam airport development had been initiated by the municipal authorities. In 1919 
mayor Zimmerman urged his commissioners to actively promote aviation in their city. A year later 
Zimmerman paid a visit to Schiphol in preparation for the construction of an airport near the city of 
Rotterdam. As opposed to Amsterdam, Rotterdam opted for a location in the dock area, based on 
the belief in the importance of seaplanes.42 This would soon turn out to be an unlucky decision. The 
Waalhaven location did not offer any possibilities for further expansion. Moreover, the airport was 
located on the south bank of the river Maas and therefore was not easy to reach from Rotterdam city 
center nor from the city of The Hague.43 Instead of investing in the construction of a new airport, 
municipal authorities in Rotterdam, nonetheless, kept investing in the modernization of Waalhaven, 
even when negotiations with The Hague about the establishment of a new airport were well under 
way.44  
The Hague, the political and administrative center of the Netherlands, lacked a civilian 
airport. In 1924 the city’s chamber of commerce presented a report to the city council, arguing for 
the construction of a new airport near the city. The mayor of The Hague, however, was rather 
pessimistic. According to mayor Patijn it would at least take twenty years before The Hague could 
be equipped with its own airport; it was not the dynamic urban policy making the Chamber of 
Commerce was hoping for.45 Eventually, after continuing pressure from local businessmen, the 
municipal government did decide to explore the opportunities for a municipal airport adopting 
several strategies. First of all, The Hague explored possibilities to establish a municipal airport in or 
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near the city. Second, municipal authorities tried to convince their Rotterdam colleagues to 
cooperate and develop a joint airport in between both cities. Third, urban government supported 
plans for the construction of a new national airport in Randstad Holland which should replace the 
existing airports near Rotterdam and Amsterdam. For financial reasons, The Hague urban governors 
initially opted for cooperation with nearby Rotterdam. When they approached their Rotterdam 
colleagues to discuss the establishment of a joint airport in between both cities, Rotterdam wanted 
to be financially compensated for their investments in Waalhaven. At first the urban government of 
The Hague agreed and plans were made for a new airport in a polder to the Northwest of 
Rotterdam, near the highway which connected the city to Delft and The Hague: plan-airport Delft. 
Waalhaven was to be sold to the Ministry of War.46 Eventually, however, The Hague again backed 
out. Mayor Bosch van Rosenthal, who succeeded Patijn in 1930, when the world economic crisis 
first emerged in the Netherlands, was not prepared to invest in airport development.  
Meanwhile, Rotterdam kept investing in its Waalhaven airport in order to keep up with 
Schiphol, which further jeopardized the plans for the construction of a new airport near Delft. 
Waalhaven, however, was soon stretched to its limits; eventually local government acknowledged 
that in order to keep up with Schiphol a new airport had to be established. The Ministry of War was 
prepared to buy Waalhaven to acquire a military airfield at a strategic position in the Dutch defense 
system. Rotterdam wanted to use the money to construct of a new municipal airport to the 
northwest of the city near the motorway to Delft and The Hague: plan-airport Zestienhoven.47 
Amsterdam looked at the Rotterdam plans with Argus’ eyes and was determined to meet the 
challenge. Several plans were made in order to upgrade and modernize Schiphol airport. In 1934 
Plesman launched his plan for the construction of a new airport in the Haarlemmermeer just north 
of the existing Schiphol airport. In order to improve the access to Schiphol, Plesman urged for the 
construction of a new terminal building near the new motorway between Amsterdam and The 
Hague. In reaction to Plesman’s plan, which appeared to be too expensive for the city’s tight 
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financial budget, Amsterdam authorities presented an alternative which amounted to the 
construction of a second terminal 200 meter west of the existing one, with concrete taxiways around 
the turf of the landing ground in order to improve take-off and landing. This plan was much cheaper 
than the Plesman plan. In the mean time, also Anthony Fokker was working on a plan for the future 
development of Schiphol airport. In his concept, the layout of the airport was based on a large 
circular landing  with a central ‘traffic island’ in the middle where all passengers and cargo 
handling could take place. The central traffic island could be accessed through a tunnel to avoid any 
obstacles on the landing terrain. In this way an optimum operational use of the airport could be 
reached. The layout of the terminal could be circular or ‘horse-shoe’ shaped, depending on the 
airport’s general layout.48 Also Fokker’s plan turned out to be too expensive and the city council 
instead opted for the expansion of existing facilities at Schiphol airport. At the height of the 
economic crisis, Schiphol was equipped with a new runway system, consisting of four runways, one 
in concrete – and an enlarged terminal building and control tower. Schiphol had become one of 
Europe’s largest airports in terms of its surface.49 
Simultaneously, however, the national government, instigated by Plesman was working on a 
plan to build a new airport near Leiderdorp, a village to the northeast of The Hague, near the city of 
Leiden. This location was chosen for its central location in between The Hague, Rotterdam and 
Amsterdam, and its accessibility by road. Strikingly, the city which had been least inclined to invest 
in airport development was to be equipped with a modern airport in its immediate surroundings. 
According to Plesman and J.A.M. van Buuren, minister of Public Works (1937-1939), the rapid 
development of aviation called for a national approach to the airport-question. Since a small country 
like the Netherlands could only afford one, modern-equipped national airport, investments in 
aviation had to be controlled by the national government. From a planning perspective, Dutch 
airport development therefore required national coordination. Existing airports near Rotterdam and 
Amsterdam appeared to be improperly located: unfit to meet the rapid developments of aviation 
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because of the composition of the soil or the lack of extension possibilities. The proponents of a 
systematic planning approach to airport development, arguing for a central location in Randstad 
Holland, however, ignored the interrelationship between airports and their urban surroudings; an 
interrelationship which had enabled the rapid development of Schiphol and Waalhaven, but which 
was entirely absent from most airport and urban planning schemes. This only adds to the uniqueness 
of the Amsterdam municipal planning department’s plans for the future development of the 
Amsterdam region, which showed the department’s awareness of the need to integrate the future 
development of both airport and city. Most urban planning elsewhere, however, was merely aimed 
at resolving local problems such as housing shortage, transport congestion, employment and the 
attraction of economic activities. The systematic integration of infrastructure planning in urban 
expansion plans was limited or totally absent.50 Like the national government also Plesman was not 
occupied with the regional impact of airport development. His views in this respect were driven by 
financial concerns and his dissatisfaction with developments at Schiphol, where spending cuts had 
hampered a complete reconstruction as envisaged by the KLM-director. 
Amsterdam and Rotterdam reacted furiously to plan-airport Leiderdorp, but Amsterdam 
appeared to be most successful in generating public protest. A civilian committee by the name of 
‘S.O.S. Schiphol’ was established by the chamber of commerce of Amsterdam, consisting of 
representatives of the Amsterdam business elite, political and social local movements, and started to 
mobilise press support for the Schiphol-cause. As mentioned in the introduction, 15.000 people 
gathered at Schiphol airport in July 1938 to demonstrate against plan-airport Leiderdorp. In this 
case planning discourse of course was unfit to press the cause of Schiphol: demonstrators referred 
to historical developments which had brought about the emergence of a modern airport near 
Amsterdam and the economic necessity of the airport for the urban economy to support their cause. 
The Amsterdam municipal government pressed the national government to designate Schiphol as 
the Dutch national airport.51 Rotterdam now feared it would loose out to Amsterdam, despite the – 
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rather tame – efforts of its chamber of commerce to press the case for airport development in or 
near Rotterdam. In fact, when the national government, confronted with fierce opposition, decided 
to abort plan-airport Leiderdorp in September 1938 and assign Schiphol the status of national 
airport, Rotterdam faced a new battle.52  
The national government’s rather inconsistent policy was met with fierce criticism and 
amounted to the establishment of the National Commission for the Settlement of the Airport 
Question.53 Meanwhile, the national government started negotiations with Amsterdam about the 
administrative reorganization of Schiphol airport which was to be turned into a public corporation 
in which both the national government and the municipality of Amsterdam would participate with 
the national government holding a majority interest of 60 percent. The establishment of a public 
corporation would enhance the possibility to finance the future development of the airport, since the 
municipal budget of Amsterdam was already stretched to – or even beyond – its limits. Discussions 
about the future of Schiphol continued well into the Second World War, despite the demolition of 
parts of the airport in May 1940 and the reestablishment of Schiphol as an operational base of the 
German Luftwaffe in July 1940. Dellaert, Plesman and representatives of the national government 
went underground to discuss rather technical and theoretical issues with regard to the airport layout 
– tangential or parallel – lighting, radio installations, safety regulations and infrastructure.54 The 
actual circumstances may have contributed to the development of future plans for Schiphol 
unhampered by the pre-war conditions: in 1943 and 1944 Schiphol was gradually destructed by 
allied bombings and German efforts to dismantle the airport on retreat. 
 
Conclusion 
Collective arrangements are dynamic: they are subject to transformation and change as is illustrated 
by the early history of Schiphol aiport. The basic collective arrangement which lay at the basis of 
Schiphol as a military airfield transformed into a mixed airport between 1919-1926 before 
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becoming a municipal airport in 1926. In fact, the key factor for the rapid development of Schiphol 
airport was the shift from a mixed airfield to a municipal airport. Schiphol had now turned into a 
predominantly local, municipal project, albeit of national significance. Where the previous 
collective arrangement had lacked a catalyst actor, the municipal government now took the 
initiative. Non-local actors were forced to renegotiate their position vis-à-vis Schiphol whose 
development was now primarily directed by the interests of the city of Amsterdam. The success of 
the municipal approach to the development of Schiphol in turn eventually necessitated the 
involvement of national state actors: in the 1930s municipally-owned Schiphol turned into an 
airport with a national appeal and significance. Moreover, in terms of investments and policy-
making Schiphol had outgrown the capabilities of the local government. In order to reach its desired 
status as the Dutch national airport a new collective arrangement had to be established, which 
involved the return of the national state as the key actor. Bringing the state back in, however, also 
involved a risk for Schiphol, as our discussion of the Dutch airport battle has made clear. Only after 
long negotiations Schiphol would emerge as the main Dutch airport. 
The early history of Schiphol has also shown that a basic collective arrangement can be 
transformed without losing its constituting components – as is illustrated by the continuous 
involvement of KLM and members of State Departments, responsible for safety regulations at the 
airport. Furthermore, in the case of Schiphol the transformation of the collective arrangement 
resulted in growing complexity. From 1958 onwards, after the national government had finally 
decided to appoint Schiphol as the Dutch national airport for international aviation, the number of 
actors directly or indirectly involved in the development of the airport increased substantially. The 
following graphs show the organization of networks of actors involved in the development of the 
airport during the pre-war and the post-war period. The graphical representation of networks of 
actors clearly shows the increased complexity of vertical, in terms of local-regional and national 
governance levels, and horizontal, between local and regional actors, interrelations (see graph 1). 
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Graph 1. Networks of actors involved in the development of Schiphol Airport between 1919 and 
1939 à  [Insert graph about here] 
 
The growing complexity mirrors the growing importance of Schiphol for the urban and 
regional economy. From the end of the 1960s onwards Schiphol turned into a real catalyst for the 
urban and regional economic development. This was part of a process of economic transformation 
in Amsterdam. After the war strong efforts to ‘industrialize’ the Amsterdam urban economy, 
centering on the development of harbor-related (petro-)chemical industries, eventually failed. From 
the 1960s onwards this modern, industrialist municipal policy would be overtaken by events which 
resulted in the – sometimes harsh – realities of post-industrialism like the deindustrialization of 
employment and population decline; Amsterdam’s population fell from its peak of 869.000 
inhabitants in 1960 to 676.000 in 1984.55 In the meantime, however, the importance of Schiphol for 
both the Amsterdam and the national economy grew significantly. From the 1960s onwards, the 
economic (and spatial) effects of Schiphol seem to be regionally widespread but strong economic 
benefits have been limited to Amsterdam and the wider Schiphol region.56 As our study has shown, 
in the case of Schiphol the creation of the airport and airport services, as well as the development of 
civil aviation during the 1920s and 1930s did not yet act as an important boost for the economic 
development of the region. The early history of Schiphol is, therefore, not so much related to 
economic, but also to institutional developments. A number of factors have been important during 
the early decades of its existence. 
 First of all, the close cooperation and personal influence of key figures like KLM director 
Plesman, Schiphol director Dellaert, Fokker, and mayor de Vlugt seems to have been decisive for 
the success of the airport in its early years. Each had their own vision, ambition and objective, but 
they all played an essential role in determining the future of Schiphol. In fact together, these actors 
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formed a coalition organized around conventions, agreements and rules, which to a great extent 
shaped the history of Schiphol during the interwar years. As true believers of the winged gospel, the 
Amsterdam urban government in particular was willing to take risks and invest in the development 
and the extension of their municipal airport, despite the economic crisis of the 1930s and despite the 
fact that Schiphol could not generate enough financial means to sustain its ambitious expansion 
plans. Rotterdam and The Hague lacked such a conglomerate of local authorities, businessmen and 
aviation enthusiasts which could catalyze airport development in or near their cities. 
Second, the early development of Schiphol was guided by civic pride and local boosterism, 
urban competition, political considerations and great enthusiasm about civil aviation technology, 
airport infrastructure and the modernism and heroism which surrounded the early history of 
aviation. From an economic point of view, the airport Schiphol (and the KLM for that matter) may 
seem an example of very inefficient business. During the early years of the airport, economic 
rationality, however, seems not to have played a major role. From the second half of the 1920s, the 
Amsterdam urban government conveyed a strong sense of urgency, of the necessity to somehow 
grab the chance, provided by Schiphol, to make a significant leap in the development of their city. 
Schiphol played a significant role in local boosterism, as was illustrated by the use of the airport to 
market a ‘modern’ image of the city, and was used as an instrument to attract investments and boost 
the local economy. In 1928, when Amsterdam hosted the Olympic Games, Schiphol was used to 
market the city as a touristic, modern city and as the economic capital of the Netherlands.57 
Third, the development of Schiphol benefitted from the fact that the airport design was 
conceived in the very early stages of the existence of Schiphol and provided for an excellent 
framework for discussions on the future development of the civil aviation in the Netherlands as a 
whole and the future of the airport Schiphol with regard to the national economy in particular.58 
These discussions were fed by formal and informal relationships between airport operators and 
professionals of civil aviation. Circulation of information about the technological development of 
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aviation and airport construction requirements took place through direct (meetings, conferences, 
work-visits) or indirect contacts (correspondence, professional magazines) within and between 
different networks worldwide. Moreover, in Amsterdam the results of this cross-fertilization of 
knowledge spillovers was used to construct plans for the future development of the airport. From 
the early 1930s, Amsterdam integrated the planning of Schiphol into the Amsterdam Development 
Plan (AUP) and into the urban development plan of the Haarlemmermeer and set up a special 
municipal commission to study and prepare the expansion of Schiphol, which clearly showed the 
growing importance of the airport for the surrounding areas and the region as a whole.59 At a very 
early stage in the development of Schiphol and although  most of the airports at that time were 
operating at a loss, Amsterdam authorities had developed a clear vision on the future of their airport 
and appeared to be fully aware of the importance of airport development for the regional economic 
growth.  
Finally, this study has aimed to contribute to an ever growing number of studies on airport 
history by focusing on the initial stages of airport development. Studying the inter war period 
appears to offer us relevant insights in the process of creation and development of airports and, 
more importantly, helps us to understand which actors and factors have contributed to the formation 
of collective arrangements which, to a great extent, determined the creation and development path 
of airports and their relationship with the surrounding urban area. In order to get to grips with the 
present position and importance of airport development at the regional level, one should therefore 
study the causes and consequences of its emergence during the pioneering era. 
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